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NOTE
WASTING THE CORPORATE WASTE DOCTRINE:
HOW THE DOCTRINE CAN PROVIDE A VIABLE
SOLUTION IN CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Steven C. Caywood*
In the midst of the global recession of the late 2000s, there was an
outcry against corporate executives and what the public deemed to
be their excessive compensation. Although this anger is still fea-
tured in today's headlines, it is nothing new. In fact, excessive
executive compensation complaints arose when the very concept of
a corporation was still new. Most of the complaints that the public
has leveled have had little effect on boards of directors' decisions.
Occasionally, however the outcry is so great that the public com-
pels a company's leadership to take action. This happened early in
2009 when American International Group ("AIG") stated that it
was paying its top executives $165 million in bonuses. Within days,
AIG, a company most Americans had not heard of was at the cen-
ter of the excessive compensation debate. Under enormous political
and public pressure, fifteen of the top twenty AIG executives agreed
to give back their bonuses. This compromise is not typical, how-
ever; for every AIG-type controversy, many other payment plans
some consider excessive are never publicly discussed. Both private
and public proposals are currently under consideration that will
limit excessive executive compensation in one way or another This
Note contends that the already existing corporate waste doctrine
can serve as a preferable alternative to legislative or executive ac-
tions. While the corporate waste doctrine is rarely used by
plaintiffs, it could be effectively enforced by using a legislative tool,
the say-on-pay provision, as a gatekeeper for the courts. This judi-
cial solution using a legislative act would allow those who are
actually affected by the excessive compensation-the sharehold-
ers-to pursue effective legal action against the corporation. The
corporate waste doctrine would be enforced more narrowly than a
statutory scheme, avoiding the possible unintended consequences of
a broadly applicable legislative or regulatory action.
* J.D. Candidate, December 2010. Thanks to my Note Editors, Nicole Dunn, Alex Edel-
son, and Peter Magnuson, for all of their advice and comments, as well as to Professor Alicia Davis,
who provided assistance in later drafts. Finally, a special thanks to my parents, Kirby and Beverly
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INTRODUCTION
"In a number of instances, executives have received compensation so
large as to cause dissatisfaction among factory and office workers, and to
lead stockholders to feel that they have been unjustly deprived of funds dis-
tributable as dividends."' This statement could have easily been made in
2010. Instead, it was written in 1941, when executive compensation was a
hot topic with the Great Depression nearing its end in the United States. As
this statement suggests, executive compensation has been controversial
since the early days of corporate law.2
Although executive compensation reform is not a modem issue, the calls
for reform are greater now than ever before. There are many possible rea-
sons for the renewed focus on executive compensation reform. Currently, a
1. George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARv. L. REv. 733,
733 (1941).
2. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 25-26 (3d ed. 2003)
(noting that excessive executive compensation played a crucial role in arguments for federal securi-
ties regulation in the 1930s).
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chief executive officer earns roughly 400 times that of an average worker in
his or her respective industry-a disparity twenty times greater than in
1965.3 This gap is problematic not merely from a social justice standpoint,
but also from an economic standpoint.4 Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, called the problem of excessive executive compensation a
threat to the "dynamism" of capitalism. Corporations exacerbate this prob-
lem when they pay executives large bonuses even when the company loses
money. Shareholders view it as fundamentally unfair when executives are
highly compensated while the stock price plummets.! The recession that
began in 2008 has stoked frustration even more.
Although previous concerns over this issue failed to generate effective
reform, the current iteration of the debate is different. First, as previously
pointed out, the level of economic disparity is growing rapidly.' Second, the
political climate favors some form of compensation reform. With Democ-
ratic majorities in both the Senate and House as well as a Democratic
president, there is a strong possibility that some reform will emerge from the
3. Albert R. Hunt, Letter From Washington: As U.S. rich-poor gap grows, so does public
outcry, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/world/
americas/18iht-letter.4637416.html.
4. But see Robert H. Frank, Should Congress Put a Cap on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/business/economy/04view.html (arguing
that current executive compensation practices are the result of a properly functioning market). This
Note argues that some executive compensation reform will likely occur; it is only a matter of choos-
ing the best method.
5. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech Before the Greater Omaha Chamber
of Commerce: The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being (Feb. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlBemanke2007O2O6a.htm. Chairman Bernanke
explained that "American economic success has resulted from the flexibility and adaptability of our
dynamic market economy." Id. He then went on to caution that if drastic income inequality contin-
ues, "the public at large might become less willing to accept the dynamism that is so essential to
economic progress." Id.
6. For example, Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers, collected roughly $480
million in compensation in the years leading up to the bank's collapse in 2008. Jonathan Siban,
Former Lehman Brothers boss attacked over Wall Street excesses, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct.
7, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/3147479/
Former-Lehman-Brothers-boss-attacked-over-Wall-Street-excesses.html. Even corporations that are
profitable, however, are still subject to compensation scrutiny. Shareholders recently sued Goldman
Sachs even though the company's share price has risen dramatically and has reported record profits
during the past year. Int'l Bhd of Elec. Workers Local 98 Pension Fund v. Blankfein, No. 5315 (Del.
Ch. filed Mar. 8 2010); see also Jonathan Stempel & Steve Eder, Goldman Sachs Sued by Big Pen-
sion Fund Over Pay, REUTERS, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE62763320100308.
7. See Marketplace (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 2, 2009), available at
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/ll/02/pm-compensation/.
8. See Harwell Wells, "No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year": The Fight Over Execu-
tive Compensation in 1930s America. 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 766 (2010) ("Vigorous political
efforts to rein in compensation are of a more recent vintage .... ).
9. See Linda Barrett, Note, Unsharing the Wealth: Recent Economic Volatility Has Greatly
Impacted Executive Compensation, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 293 (2001) (noting that CEO salaries
grew sixfold from 1990 to 2001).
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federal government in the near future.0o Finally, the current global economic
crisis is the most severe since World War II.' It is unlikely a coincidence
that the Supreme Court first recognized the corporate waste doctrine in the
midst of a similar economic crisis-the Great Depression.12
Given these factors, the conditions are ripe for executive compensation
reform, and reform appears imminent. The question has become, what form
should reform take? This Note examines a variety of potential reforms, in-
cluding some that have been implemented and others that are under
consideration. For instance, a bill currently before the Senate, the Corporate
and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act, has a say-on-pay pro-
vision, which would require shareholders to vote annually on executive
compensation structures." Representative Barney Frank, who introduced the
bill, stated that "[uinder this bill, the question of compensation amounts will
now be in the hands of shareholders." 4 This quote is not entirely accurate,
however, because the say-on-pay vote would only be advisory and nonbind-
ing on the board of directors.
Many reform discussions overlook the fact that there is already an exist-
ing legal doctrine designed to deal with excessive executive compensation
claims: the corporate waste doctrine." A waste claim is a relatively simple
one. It is brought by shareholders against a company's board of directors
10. See Jim Puzzanghera, Massive Financial Reform Passes House, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, at Al (discussing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's speech on financial and compensation re-
form in which she stated that "[w]e are sending a clear message to Wall Street: The party is over");
see also infra note 13.
11. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, Jan. 28, 2009,
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/index.htm (examining global
gross domestic product figures and determining that the most recent recession caused the largest
drop in gross domestic product since the end of World War II).
12. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); see also Wells, supra note 8, at 766.
13. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269,
11Ith Cong. (2009). On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act made say-on-pay federal law. Id. at § 951 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78n-1). The framework of the say-on-pay provision from the earlier bill
referenced elsewhere in this Note is largely the same as the framework adopted in the new law.
Therefore, the arguments made in this Note are largely intact. The federal say-on-pay provision
requires that every three years, shareholders, during their annual meeting, conduct a "separate reso-
lution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives." Id. Every six years,
the annual shareholder meeting "shall include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to
determine whether [the say-on-pay required every three years] will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years." Id.
Therefore, at the very minimum, a corporation subject to the Security and Exchange Commission's
proxy rules will conduct a say-on-pay vote every three years. Id. The shareholder vote will not be
binding and not "create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of direc-
tors." Id. Although it could be argued that a reinvigorated corporate waste doctrine as a result of a
disapproving say-on-pay resolution is a change in the board of directors' fiduciary duties, this Note
is instead arguing that the say-on-pay vote should be used as evidence of possible corporate waste,
and not an alteration of the standard itself.
14. David Cho & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, House Backs Greater Say On Pay by Sharehold-
ers, WASH. PosT, Aug. 1, 2009, at A9.
15. See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 532-34 (2d ed. 2008).
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alleging that the board wasted company assets." Waste can include any dis-
tribution of company assets," but the doctrine, when invoked, is most
commonly employed for executive compensation claims. The corporate
waste doctrine has been described as an "equitable safety valve," meaning
that it can be used for cases where relief would be otherwise unavailable.'9
Unfortunately, this safety valve is rarely invoked, which allows many seem-
ingly valid excessive compensation claims to go unchecked.20
There are several reasons why the doctrine is not used. For one, the
standard adopted for the corporate waste doctrine is impossibly high, which
often leads courts to dismiss waste claims at the initial stages of litigation.
Because of the doctrine's infrequent use, there is a dearth of academic de-
bate over its use and effectiveness concerning executive compensation.2 1 The
doctrine has potential for meaning again, however, if used with the proposed
say-on-pay legislation.
This Note argues that, in conjunction with the proposed say-on-pay
resolution, a revitalized corporate waste doctrine would empower share-
holders to curb excessive compensation by making shareholders' say-on-pay
votes effectively binding. Part I discusses the viability of a series of poten-
tial solutions, including the corporate waste doctrine, that shareholders
could use to address excessive executive compensation. Part II proposes a
litigation strategy that would invigorate the corporate waste doctrine by us-
ing it in conjunction with the say-on-pay resolution, thereby providing
shareholders with a viable solution for enforcing excessive executive com-
pensation claims.
I. POTENTIAL EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORMS
Executive compensation in large publicly traded firms is often excessive
in part "because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police
compensation."22 Directors can theoretically be ousted by a vote of share-
holders, but this is a rare occurrence.23 Board members are often influential
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 533.
19. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 895 (Del. Ch. 1999).
20. For an example of a case of excessive compensation that has yet to result in a corporate
waste claim, see Siban, supra note 6.
21. The corporate waste doctrine has been the main subject of only one law review article in
at least the past five years. See John W. Murrey, III, Excessive Compensation in Publicly Held Cor-
porations: Is the Doctrine of Waste Still Applicable?, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 433 (2005) (arguing that
the corporate waste doctrine is not clearly defined as applied by Delaware courts and calling for a
more coherent explanation of the standard).
22. Jones v. Harris Assoc., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
23. See Stephen Deane, Majority Voting in Director Elections: From the Symbolic to the
Democratic, 1543 PLI/CoRP. 331, 352 (2006) ("Furthermore, the ability of shareholders at certain
companies to remove directors is far from a universal right. Shareholders can only exercise that right
by going through an extraordinary process that is expensive and fraught with restrictions.").
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in company management. Many board chairmen are also CEOs or founders
of the corporation.2 It would be extremely difficult to oust these board
members, even when they are excessively compensating executives." Fur-
thermore, shareholders may realize that ousting a director over one bad
action is an unwise decision. It is unreasonable to suggest that shareholders
must remove a board member every time there is a disagreement.
As a result of the lack of incentives to the board of directors, many pro-
posals for measures to combat excessive executive compensation have been
proposed in recent years. Many of these proposals are at least partially ef-
fective, but none of them provides a complete solution. This Part catalogues
the most promising resources, both currently available and under considera-
tion, in combating excessive executive compensation. Section L.A discusses
the corporate waste doctrine and explains why the doctrine, by itself, fails
to provide shareholders with an effective tool for combating excessive ex-
ecutive compensation. Section I.B discusses a bill containing a nonbinding
say-on-pay resolution that Congress is currently considering, and argues
that this bill alone will also prove inadequate in attempting to prevent ex-
cessive executive compensation. Section I.C explains "clawback
provisions" and similarly argues that they are ill-equipped to solve the
executive compensation problem. Section I.D discusses a strict pay cap on
either executive bonuses or total compensation, and likewise posits that such
caps will not suffice. Finally, Section I.E examines the effectiveness of in-
creased salary transparency-a proposal already in use-and explains why
such transparency has yet to prove effective.
A. The Corporate Waste Doctrine's Inability to
Provide a Solution on Its Own
The corporate waste doctrine fails to provide adequate executive com-
pensation reform for two reasons. First, as demonstrated by the Delaware
courts, the the doctrine imposes an impossibly high standard on shareholder
plaintiffs.26 Second, as a result of this high standard, Delaware courts often
24. Corporate best practices now state that the CEO should be separate from the board
chairman, and more corporations are following this practice. See Martha Graybow, More Firms Split
CEO and Chairman Roles, REUTERS, June 16, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKN 1634597920080616.
25. See Deane, supra note 23.
26. Because corporate law is generally made at the state level, state courts apply the corpo-
rate waste doctrine of their particular state. This Note relies solely on Delaware's corporate law
because its corporate code, the Delaware General Corporation Law, is considered the most sophisti-
cated corporate code in the country. This has made Delaware the state of incorporation for a
majority of the most sophisticated U.S. companies and provides it with the country's most authorita-
tive and cited-to corporate law jurisprudence. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech,
Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 1103, 1142-43
(2002); Marcia Coyle, Facing the Fallout: Delaware Courts in Crosshairs, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 13,
2008. Additionally, other states routinely cite Delaware law as support even though Delaware's law
has no binding effect on them. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("[Clourts of other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in
fashioning rules of corporate law."); Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Share-
116 [Vol. 109:111
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refuse to allow waste claims to advance beyond the initial stages of litiga-
27tion. Because shareholder plaintiffs are not able to plead facts to meet the
high burden imposed by the corporate waste doctrine, no discovery occurs
in corporate waste claims, so no determinations are made as to whether
boards of directors have committed waste.
1. The Delaware Courts Don't Apply the Corporate Waste Doctrine
Because the Standard Is Difficult to Enforce in Isolation
The first criticism, that Delaware courts refuse to apply the corporate
waste doctrine because the burden on plaintiffs is impossibly high, is the
product of case law that has created an unwieldy doctrine. The corporate
waste doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that can be employed by
shareholders in an attempt to combat excessive executive compensation. The
Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine in 1933.s In Rogers v. Hill,
shareholders sued American Tobacco Company directors for paying what
29the shareholders believed to be excessive bonuses to corporate executives.
The Court held that corporate waste occurs "[i]f a bonus payment has no
relation to the value of services for which it is given," noting that "it is in
reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders have no power to give
away corporate property against the protest of the minority.,,30 The Court
held that a full evidentiary hearing was warranted to determine whether
waste occurred." It remanded to the lower court accordingly.32
Delaware adopted the corporate waste standard from Rogers v. Hill in
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical." In Gottlieb, the court approved of the stan-
dard espoused in Rogers and concluded, "We must evaluate the services to
be rendered by the particular employees for the periods reserved, and to that
factor we must relate the values of the respective options."34 After little more
development in the doctrine, Delaware examined the corporate waste stan-
dard again in the landmark case of Brehm v. Eisner." Brehm was a
derivative suit filed by shareholders for wasteful action by Walt Disney
holder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60
FLA. L. REv. 589, 593 (2008).
27. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
28. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
29. Id. at 591.
30. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Rogers, 50 F.2d at 113-14 (1932)).
31. Id. at 592.
32. Id.
33. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952). The Delaware Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, even though the shareholders ap-
pr3ved the compensation plan and there was ro claim that the board acted dishonestly or without
good faith. Id. at 665.
34. Id.
35. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
117October 2010]
118 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:111
Company's board of directors in the hiring and subsequent firing of CEO
Michael Ovitz.16
The Brehm court discussed the corporate waste standard and decided, as
earlier courts had, that there may be a time when compensation is so high as
to constitute waste. 37 The court then said, however, "If ... there is any sub-
stantial consideration received by the corporation, and if there is a good
faith judgment that in the circumstances the transaction is worthwhile, there
should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder would conclude ex post
that the transaction was unreasonably risky."
The waste standard was again examined in In re The Walt Disney Com-
pany Derivative Litigation. This case examined the events surrounding
former Disney CEO Ovitz, just as Brehm did. 9 The court dismissed the
plaintiff shareholders' waste claim because the corporation was contractu-
ally obligated to pay Ovitz and there was little to suggest that the contract
was wasteful ex ante.4 The corporate waste standard, as evidenced by the
Delaware courts' treatment of waste claims, is extremely difficult for plain-
tiff shareholders to meet.
Although the corporate waste doctrine seemed all but abandoned after In
re Walt Disney,4' a recent Chancery Court decision-In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation-may have given it new life.42 In reaf
firming the corporate waste doctrine, the court stated:
The directors of a Delaware corporation have the authority and broad dis-
cretion to make executive compensation decisions. The standard under
which the Court evaluates a waste claim is whether there was an exchange
36. Id. at 248. Ovitz was hired as the successor to Michael Eisner, chairman and chief execu-
tive at the time. Id. at 249. Ovitz's contract entitled him to a salary of $1,000,000 per year for five
years, payment of a discretionary bonus, and stock options. Id. at 250. If the Board removed Ovitz
without cause, he would be entitled to his full contract plus $10,000,000 with an additional
$7,500,000 for each year remaining on his contract. Id. Most importantly, unless fired for cause,
Ovitz would be able to exercise his stock options for 3,000,000 shares. Id. Just fourteen months after
signing this contract, Disney's board removed Ovitz without cause on December 27, 1996. Id. at
252. Ovitz then exercised his options and Disney paid him roughly $140,000,000. Id. at 253.
37. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 262 n.56 ("[T]here is an outer limit to that discretion, at which point
a decision of the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately large as to be uncon-
scionable and constitute waste.").
38. Id. at 263.
39. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73-75 (Del. 2006).
40. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
41. Indeed, Delaware courts even seemed skeptical that plaintiffs could ever prove a waste
claim:
[The waste theory represents a theoretical exception to the statement very rarely encountered
in the world of real transactions. There surely are cases of fraud; of unfair self dealing and,
much more rarely negligence. But rarest of all-and indeed like Nessie, possibly non existent-
would be the case of disinterested business people making non fraudulent deals (non-
negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!
Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (internal citation omitted). In Part II, this
Note will propose that these cases, while possibly rare, exist.
42. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.
It is also well settled in our law, however, that the discretion of directors in
setting executive compensation is not unlimited. Indeed, the Delaware Su-
preme Court was clear when it stated that there is an outer limit to the
board's discretion to set executive compensation, at which point a decision
of the directors on executive compensation is so disproportionately large as
to be unconscionable and constitute waste.
Shareholder plaintiffs claimed that an agreement giving former Citi-
group ("Citi") CEO Charles Prince $68 million, an office, an administrative
assistant, and a car and driver for five years constituted waste." The share-
holder plaintiffs pointed to the fact that Prince was largely responsible for
the billions of dollars of losses Citi sustained that resulted in the near col-
lapse of the company.45 The plaintiff shareholders claimed it was wasteful for
the Citi board of directors to pay Prince $68 million merely for signing "a
non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a non-solicitation
agreement, and a release of claims against the Company."46 Denying Prince's
motion to dismiss, the court allowed the shareholder plaintiffs to survive early
dismissal and continue with discovery.47 The litigation is currently ongoing in
Delaware courts. In re Citigroup may weaken the heavy burden imposed by
Brehm and In re Walt Disney and open the door for a successful shareholder
*48claim of excessive executive compensation.
Thus, while Delaware courts continue to state "that there is an outer lim-
it to the board's discretion to set executive compensation,"49 they are
reluctant to actually find a case that passes this limit and determine that
there is waste. The only thing clear from the Delaware courts' discussion of
the substantive standard of the corporate waste doctrine is that plaintiffs face
a heavy burden in proving a waste claim.
43. Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
44. Id.
45. See Derivative Complaint at 1 18, In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964
A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) 2007 WL 5208459.
46. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.
47. Id. at 139.
48. Perhaps because of In re Citigroup, corporations expect a rise in shareholder litigation,
including a renewed focus on the corporate waste doctrine. See Kevin H. Douglass & D. Scott Hol-
ley, The Path Ahead: Corporate Law Current Trends and Forecasts for 2010, FIN. FRAUD L., Dec.
28, 2009, at 387, available at http://www.bassberry.com/files/uploadfrhePathAhead2009.pdf ("Over
the next year, we expect more fiduciary duty decisions in the area of corporate oversight, including
in the compensation arena (and a possible tightening of the corporate waste doctrine) .... "). This
increase in litigation may ?ctu&lly be harmful to the long-term viability of the corporate waste doc-
trine: a deluge of corporate waste cases before Delaware courts may lead the overburdened courts to
dismiss waste claims in preliminary motions, as they have been prone to do in the past.
49. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. An Insufficient Number of Corporate Waste
Claims Survives a Motion to Dismiss
The eagerness of Delaware courts to dismiss waste claims at an early
stage makes the corporate waste doctrine ineffective in controlling excessive
executive compensation.o In fact, Delaware's treatment of the corporate
waste doctrine may be inconsistent and unworkable as described above be-
cause so few waste claims are actually evaluated on the merits. The fact that
at least one Delaware court has stated that the doctrine has "many practical
problems" might explain in part why the courts have dismissed so many
waste claims at this early stage."
Delaware courts have had difficulty applying the corporate waste doc-
trine in part because, when first outlining the doctrine, the Supreme Court5
did not provide a threshold for when a corporate waste case could survive a
motion for early dismissal." In subsequent cases, courts have suggested that
they would need to engage in an evidentiary hearing to determine if the
board of directors committed waste.54 Later Delaware courts have redefined
the threshold for dismissal. Following earlier cases," the Delaware Supreme
Court dismissed the Brehm waste claim for failure by the plaintiffs to make
a demand on the corporation as required under Chancery Rule 23.1.6 The
purpose of Rule 23.1 is to require plaintiff shareholders to make a demand
50. See Murrey, supra note 21, at 457.
51. The Delaware courts have never stated explicitly that this is the reason for its disuse, but
they have complained that the doctrine has "many practical problems." Harbor Fin. Partners v. Hui-
zenga, 751 A.2d 879, 896 (Del. Ch. 1999). It is not surprising, then, that courts would dismiss and
rarely invoke a doctrine with "many practical problems."
52. It is important to note that the Supreme Court decision in Rogers v. Hill applied New
Jersey corporate law and thus was not binding on Delaware state law. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.
582, 584 (1933). Nonetheless, Delaware did adopt the corporate waste standard. Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 665 (Del. 1952).
53. Murrey, supra note 21, at 457.
54. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997) (describing that with a valid
waste claim, "a full hearing is required regardless of shareholder ratification" (quoting Michelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979))).
55. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
56. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000). The portion of Chancery Rule 23.1 the
Delaware Supreme Court relied on to dismiss these cases appears as follows:
In a derivative action brought by I or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a
corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to
enforce a right which may properly by asserted by it, the complaint shall allege that the plain-
tiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains
or that the plaintiffs share of membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of
law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the rea-
sons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (emphasis added). The demand requirement is met when the plaintiff gives
notice to the corporation of its claims and demands the corporation takes action. Plaintiffs are reluc-
tant to make a demand requirement as this empowers the board of directors to form a litigation
committee. This committee can recommend that the claim has no merit and Delaware courts will
defer to this recommendation. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 671-72.
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on the corporation's board of directors before commencing a derivative
suit. 7 If the plaintiffs fail to make a demand of the board of directors, the
lawsuit is subject to dismissal unless the plaintiffs' pleadings sufficiently
demonstrate that the demand would be futile.5 Delaware courts likely in-
voke Rule 23.1 because the Supreme Court did not define a threshold for
dismissal in Rogers.
The court in In re Citigroup, like earlier courts, concluded that a waste
claim that does not contest the independence or personal interest of the
board of directors implicates only the second prong of the Aronson test. 9
Under the second prong of the Aronson test,
[t]he inquiry ... is whether a reasonable doubt is created that the Director
[d]efendants' "challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment." In other words, demand will be excused if
[p1laintiffs' allegations raise a reasonable doubt that the Board was well-
informed, careful and rational in approving [the transaction].6
The plaintiffs in In re Citigroup were able to raise this "reasonable doubt"
and thus survive Rule 23.1 scrutiny.
Perhaps because In re Citigroup is not the norm and waste claims
are routinely dismissed,62 Delaware courts provide little detail on the logis-
tics of an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing would likely require
discovery in order for the court to determine if there is waste. 63 Discovery,
especially in large corporate cases, is an expensive and time-
consuming process,6 a burden to both the parties as well as the
57. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).
58. Id. But see Murrey, supra note 21, at 454 (arguing that waste claims cannot be dismissed
on Rule 23.1 grounds because the court always must determine if there is waste). Murrey contends
that further litigation is required because the board of directors cannot sanction waste. See id. If this
is true, then every waste allegation would require an evidentiary hearing and discovery to determine
if waste occurred. Id.
59. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 120 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (1985)). In
Part II, this Note will propose a litigation strategy, which includes pleading the independence and
lack of personal interest of the board of directors to fall under the second prong of Aronson. Al-
though this would not have been necessary under Rogers and Gottlieb, modem Delaware corporate
law requires it.
60. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814).
61. 964 A.2d at 83-84.
62. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263-64 (Del. 2000); In re The Limited, Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002); Har-
bor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892-93 (Del. Ch. 1999); see also YALE D. TAUBER &
DONALD R. LEVY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 730-42 (2002).
63. Cf Winkelman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (speak-
ing approvingly of the executive compensation plan but nonetheless denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment).
64. When they survive a defendant's motion to dismiss, shareholder suits against corpora-
tions tcnd to settle at a rate higher than that of other civIl litigation. See, e.g., nienn- Ching, Dnps
Negative Equity Negate the Hanging Paragraph?, 16 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 497 (2008)
(describing evidentiary hearings as costly and time-consuming in bankruptcy cases); Jennifer J.
Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder Claims, 36 SEc. REG. L.J. 181,
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courts. Because discovery is so taxing, requiring an evidentiary hearing in
every case seems unreasonable and would lead to a tremendous strain on the
parties and the courts.6 Evidentiary hearings should not always be required
as some suggest, but they should be available in certain circumstances-a
position for which this Note argues in Part II.6 Whatever the function of an
evidentiary hearing, the fact remains that courts do not currently have a suit-
able doctrine to apply in order to use an evidentiary hearing.
B. The Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act
of 2009: A Positive Change, but Ineffective on Its Own
The say-on-pay resolution, included as part of the Corporate and Finan-
cial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009,8 contains some positive
attributes, but is ineffective on its own because it is nonbinding on boards of
directors. Congress is currently considering a bill that, by giving sharehold-
ers a "say on pay," attempts to reform how banking executives are
201 n.19 (2008) ("Due to the enormous expense involved in proceeding through discovery to trial
and the potential for damages that could imperil the company's future operations, most cases settle
if plaintiffs' complaint survives the motion to dismiss. For example, for securities class actions filed
between 1996 and 2007, 81% have been concluded: 41% were dismissed and 59% settled. Only 11
cases went to trial.").
65. Cf Robert Mason Hogg, Note, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review In ERISA
Benefits Litigation After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1575, 1598 (1994)
(citing Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1559 (5th Cir. 1991) to show the Fifth
Circuit's implication that evidentiary hearings are burdensome on the courts).
66. See Murrey, supra note 21, at 437 (stating that if an evidentiary hearing was always
required, it would "invite excessive litigation").
67. This Note does not attempt to outline how courts should analyze compensation packages.
Many have argued that the important benchmark for best-practices executive compensation is to take
long-term company value into account. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 669 (2005); Richard C. Ferlauto, Compen-
sation Best Practices Overview, 1774 PLI/CORP 47, 51 ("[T]he Committee for Economic
Development, a distinguished panel of business and academic leaders, found that [diecision making
based primarily on short-term considerations damages the ability of public companies, and there-
fore, of the U.S. economy to sustain superior long-term performance.") (internal quotation marks
omitted). Rather, this Note assumes that if the corporate waste doctrine continues to develop, the
courts will develop a robust body of law on best practices for executive compensation. Take, for
example, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act jurisprudence. The Act placed sovereign immunity
questions squarely in the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Although the federal courts had little
experience with this area of law, they quickly became experts in applying immunity claims. BARRY
E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2007); see also Pamela J. Stephens, Beyond Tor-
ture: Enforcing International Human Rights in Federal Courts, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 941, 966
(2001) ("Similarly, as federal courts have over the past twenty years taken on the task of norm-
enunciation in the realm of international human rights, confidence has grown in their expertise to
address such issues."). Delaware courts are similarly capable of determining best practices for ex-
ecutive compensation.
68. As of March, 16, 2010, the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness
Act of 2009 has not passed. It is likely, however, that a say-on-pay provision will pass in some form.
On March 15, 2010, Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) introduced a bill which included a say-on-pay
resolution. Sewell Chan, Dodd to Unveil a Comprehensive Financial Overhaul Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2010, at A 18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14bank.html.
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compensated.6 A say-on-pay resolution would require shareholders to pass a
vote on compensation packages at the annual shareholders meeting.70 The
shareholder vote would be advisory, meaning "[t]he shareholder vote shall
not be binding on the corporation or the board of directors and shall not be
construed as overruling a decision by such board, nor to create or imply any
additional fiduciary duty by such board .. ..
Another provision in the bill attempts to prevent "perverse incentives" in
compensation packages by appointing a financial regulator.72 While the bill
does not describe in detail what "perverse incentives" are, the provision is likely
aimed at preventing systemic risk-risk that is so large it affects the greater
economy.73 The financial regulator provision requires large financial institutions
to disclose their compensation plans to a federal regulator.7 4 The regulator would
review compensation plans to prevent risks that "(A) could threaten the safety
and soundness of covered financial institutions; or (B) could have serious ad-
verse effects on economic conditions or financial stability."75
The proposed bill would provide a good basis for solving the problem of
excessive executive compensation, but it would fail to provide a complete
solution. Those calling for change to the executive compensation structure
generally accept a say-on-pay provision as a positive reform," because it
would give some explicit authority for shareholders to take action. By mak-
ing the say-on-pay resolution nonbinding, however, the bill adds little to the
current law with regard to shareholder rights. Shareholders can already dis-
approve of a corporation's compensation package in the same advisory way
a say-on-pay resolution would operate. In fact, Shell Oil's shareholders
passed a nonbinding resolution disapproving of executive pay packages in
69. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269,
111th Cong. (2009). As noted above, "say on pay" is now federal law. See supra note 13. Any refer-
ence to the previous bill should be supplanted with the Dodd-Frank Bill.
70. H.R. 3269.
71. Id.
72. The description of the bill in the first sentence reads, "A Bill [t]o amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation and
to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation practices of financial institutions." Id.
73. These regulators will also have control over executive compensation in these corpora-
tions. Id. § 4. This is likely to prevent systemic risk-which occurs when a corporation grows so
large that its insolvency would drastically affect the entire economy-from materializing. See gen-
erally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION 75-112 (2009) (assessing causes of the financial crisis, including systemic risk).
74. H.R. 3269.
75. Id. § 4(a)(3).
76. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 195-99 (2004).
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2009." Because this resolution was nonbinding, the Shell board of directors
took no action, nor was it required to do so.
Nevertheless, the say-on-pay provision would be useful in the sense that
it would explicitly mandate routine shareholder votes. Under the current
shareholder proposal system, a shareholder can present a resolution only if
certain requirements are met.7 These resolutions are not frequently pro-
posed, however, because they require an affirmative shareholder act merely
to raise a resolution.so The current shareholder resolution system is compli-
cated and results in heavy litigation over the validity of resolutions.
Because the say-on-pay votes would be required to occur regularly-at a
company's annual meeting 8 2-it would be easier for shareholders to voice
their disapproval because the votes would be mandated. Nonetheless, while
the say-on-pay provision has many advantages, it still does not provide a
complete solution.
The federal regulator provision would be similarly ill-equipped to solve
the problem of excessive executive compensation because it is too broad to
ensure consistent enforcement. The level of enforcement would depend en-
tirely on the individual federal regulator." The regulator's broad discretion
could lead to both over- and under-enforcement. A regulator lax on en-
forcement might rubber stamp all compensation plans. The regulation
provision also leads to under-enforcement because it only applies to large
financial companies. Other companies that excessively compensate may fly
under the regulator's radar. On the other hand, an overly aggressive regula-
tor could bog down corporations because every compensation system could
theoretically be subject to painstaking scrutiny.
Additionally, the regulator would not give the shareholders any power to
address their concerns about excessive compensation. Instead, the share-
holders would be subject to the decisions of the federal regulator. While
government regulation is necessary for some corporate governance issues,
77. Attacking the corporate gravy train, ECONOMIST, May 30, 2009, at 71 (discussing a
British say-on-pay shareholder resolution disapproving of the executive compensation at Royal
Dutch Shell). The Shell board of directors notably did not take any action as a result of the nonbind-
ing resolution. Id.
78. Knotting the Purse Strings, EcoNoMIsT, Aug. 8, 2009, at 57 ("In May 59% of voting
shareholders of Royal Dutch Shell, an oil giant, rejected the executive pay package for 2008, but the
company intends to pay it anyway-though it lamely promised to consult shareholders more closely
in future.").
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; see also SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 450-52.
80. These resolutions are increasing, but do not occur as regularly as a say-on-pay proposal
would. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 460 (describing these proposals as "an especially
vibrant area for corporate governance .. . today").
81. Id. at 463.
82. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009) ("Any proxy or consent or authorization for an annual meeting of the share-
holders . . . shall provide for a separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives
as disclosed pursuant to the Commission's compensation disclosure rules . . . .").
83. H.R. 3269 (providing few guidelines as to when a regulator should exercise his or her
authority).
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many feel that it is not necessary for executive compensation. As Judge Pos-
ner has recognized, the concern is not a lack of government regulation, but
instead a lack of any incentive for boards of directors." Shareholders, not a
federal regulator, should provide this incentive, as they are the ones directly
affected by excessive executive compensation.
C. Clawback Provisions Can Be Effective but Are Also Too Narrow
to Provide a Complete Solution
Although clawback provisions are a well-regarded, market-based ap-
proach used to control excessive compensation, they do not broadly curb
excessive executive compensation because they are simply a matter of con-
tract between the executive and the corporation. Clawback provisions are
one of the most discussed of the recent proposed reforms to executive com-
pensation.8 "Clawback provision" is a broad term that describes a
mechanism for recovering benefits that a corporation pays an executive.16
Clawbacks can take many forms, but are often written into executives' con-
tracts as express provisions. Clawbacks are increasing in popularity.
Goldman Sachs, for example, recently indicated that it may implement them
into executives' contracts in order to recover from executives whose trades
go bad after their bonuses are paid."
Because "clawback" is such a broad term, the utility of clawbacks de-
pends on the form they take. Clawback provisions can be either prospective
or retroactive. Prospective clawback provisions are written when the execu-
tive compensation contract is negotiated, whereas retroactive clawbacks are
invoked after payment to the executive has already been made absent a pro-
spective clawback provision." An example of a retroactive measure is when
the House of Representatives, in response to the AIG bonus payments,
passed a bill taxing certain corporations 90 percent on their bonus pay-
ments.90 Executives who sign a prospective clawback provision, as opposed
to a retroactive clawback, are aware that their actions can have negative con-
sequences even after compensation has been received, which incentivizes
good action.9' Conversely, retroactive clawback provisions do not change
84. See Jones v. Harris Assoc., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
85. Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era
of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REv. 368 (2009) (arguing
for the use of a prospective clawback provision as a method of executive compensation reform).
86. Id. at 372-73.
87. Id.
88. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Don't Fail, Or Reward Success, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 12, 2009, at B l.
Over 300 companies now have some form of clawback provision, up from only fourteen years ago.
Gretchen Morgenson, Pay It Back If You Didn't Earn It, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at B l.
89. Cherry & Wong, supra note 85, at 372.
90. H.R. 1586. 111 th Cong. § 1 (2009).
91. Cherry & Wong, supra note 85, at 392 ("One of the major problems with executive com-
pensation has been a focus only upon short-term performance. Such short-term thinking often leads
to opportunistic behavior, at the expense of the long-term health of the company. By in a sense
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behavior because executives are unaware that they will be subject to a claw-
back provision until the actions for which their bonuses are being "clawed
back" are complete. Because knowledge of a clawback provision changes
incentives, some view prospective clawback provisions as more effective."
Prospective clawback provisions can be used effectively by corpora-
tions, which may lead to satisfied shareholders. 3 As a result, derivative
lawsuits may be avoided if shareholders feel that the corporation is effec-
tively dealing with excessive executive compensation.94 It is unlikely that an
executive compensation structure with a prospective clawback provision
would be subject to a corporate waste claim.95 Even if a corporate waste
claim is brought and advances to the evidentiary hearing stage, the exis-
tence of a prospective clawback provision would be evidence against an
argument that the board engaged in corporate waste, because the provision
affirmatively put in place a mechanism to prevent waste.
Although these provisions may be a good market-initiated safeguard to
control executive pay when incorporated into a contract prospectively, they
do not broadly curb excessive executive compensation because they are
simply a matter of contract between the executive and the corporation. Con-
ceivably, shareholders could begin to demand that clawback provisions
become boilerplate language in executive compensation contracts. There
would likely be pushback, however, from CEOs who prefer not to have any
clawback provision in their contracts. Corporations may be forced to accept
contracts without clawback provisions in an effort to attract top CEOs. Short
of a broad-based acceptance, clawback provisions would have to be man-
dated by federal regulation to become an effective tool.
D. Pay Caps Can Be Overly Intrusive on a Corporation
Although pay caps are a simple and effective method of controlling ex-
cessive executive compensation, they are overly intrusive and decouple pay
from performance. Pay caps function relatively simply: a regulatory body
establishes a limit and executives cannot receive compensation that exceeds
that limit.97
operating as a 'lead parachute,' prospective clawback provisions begin to align incentives over a
longer time frame.").
92. Id. at 411-12.
93. An example of one such effective use would be to require inclusion of prospective claw-
back provisions in employment contracts and thereby eliminate the need for retroactive clawback
solutions.
94. See infra Section II.B.
95. A corporate waste claim likely would not advance without a negative say-on-pay resolu-
tion. See infra Section II.A. Shareholders would be unlikely to disapprove of a pay structure with a
clawback provision because this would provide evidence that the corporation was sensitive to exces-
sive executive compensation. Of course, it is possible that the clawback provision would not be
adequate to prevent excessive compensation.
96. See infra Section II.A.
97. See Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap: Stimulus
Puts Retroactive Curb on Bailout Recipients, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, at Al.
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To illustrate, before the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, where partici-
98
pating European nations discussed various executive pay reforms, the
French proposed a strict cap on bonuses. 9 Also in 2009, Congress tightened
restrictions on the Troubled Assets Relief Program ("TARP").'"' Many
Americans felt that corporations receiving funds should be restricted in
many areas, including executive compensation.o In response to this criti-
cism, Congress regulated compensation for these companies by restricting
compensation "for performance" to one-third of an executive's securities
compensation package.
Although executive salary caps could provide a simple method of en-
forcing executive compensation reform, such a system would have major
flaws. The caps proposed typically only govern one aspect of executive
compensation, such as salary. This means that an executive's total compen-
sation can remain the same by shifting his or her compensation to other
forms.03 Under such a system, any reform would be illusory. To be fair, the
government could easily solve this by deciding to place a cap on total com-
pensation. Such a cap, however, may be overly intrusive and punitive. Many
critics of executive compensation reform claim that any reform would cause
the best executives in the United States to relocate abroad to avoid regula-
tion,'04 rendering the reform counterproductive.o5
Decoupling compensation from performance is also problematic. First,
while it seems like a wise method to lower total pay, imposing strict bonus
caps does not accomplish its goal of making executives more accountable to
shareholders and increasing long-term corporate value.' 6 Nothing in these
restrictions would prevent a corporation from increasing an executive's fixed
98. Stephen Castle, French Ideas for Curbs on Bonuses Get E. U. Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/global/03euro.html.
99. Suzy Jagger, France set to go it alone and cap bank bonuses, TIMES (London), Sept. 5,
2009, News, at 8. This proposal was not adopted at the G20 summit.
100. Troubled Assets Relief Program, 12 U.S.C.S. § 5221 (West 2009). TARP allowed the
government to lend money to struggling banks because of the financial crisis. It was passed in late
2008 but this section of the code was amended in early February 2009. Edmund L. Andrews & Eric
Dash, Stimulus Plan Tightens Reins on Wall St. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at Al.
101. See Jay Newton-Small, The AIG Bonuses: Getting Mad and Getting Even, TIME, Mar.
18, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1885977,00.html.
102. 12 U.S.C.S. § 5221(b)(3)(D)(i)(III).
103. Lucian Bebchuk, Pay Caps Debate: They Don't Go Far... , WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2009,
at All.
104. Kevin Crowley, G-20 Pay Plans Risk Losing Top Employees, Bankers Say, BLOOMBERG,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aWjMXU1Mbk4Q.
105. Id.
106. Many believe that long-term corporate value means a high stock price. TIM KOLLER ET.
AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 391 (4th ed. 2005) (stat-
ing that company value, and by extension shareholder value, is driven partially by long-term
company outlook). While this is partially true, long-term company value focuses mainly on the
future viability of the corporation. See generally Dean Krehmeyer et al., Breaking the Short-Term




salary, thus severing the tie between compensation and long-term company
performance. While an executive's performance may not be adequately
measured now,'07 the solution is not to completely sever the relationship
between compensation and the corporation's value, but instead to make it
closer.'8 Increasing an executive's fixed salary would allow the executive to
expose the company to more risk because the executive's salary would not
be tied to the corporation's health.' The only incentive for an executive
receiving a fixed salary would be to keep his job. Thus, an executive would
take steps to increase the corporation's value for the time he or she is at the
corporation and possibly at the expense of long-term value."o
E. More Transparency in Executives' Salaries Has Done Little
to Prevent Excessive Executive Compensation
Although transparency in executives' salaries may be a sensible reform,
such disclosure does little to combat excessive executive compensation. This
method would require corporations to disclose to the SEC how much they
are paying executives."' The rationale behind this requirement is that forc-
ing corporations to disclose their executives' compensation to regulatory
bodies would make them more sensitive to how much they are paying their
executives.
Reporting executive compensation may play some role in controlling it,
but only if corporations fear government action. For example, the Obama
Administration in 2009 cut the executive salaries of certain corporations
receiving government bailout money by 50 percent."2 Coupling this drastic
step with increased salary reporting would be an effective method of con-
trolling executive compensation. Such a system, however, is not optimal
because it takes the decision about executive compensation away from
where it belongs: with the shareholders who own the corporation.
107. Some agree that deferred compensation such as stock options that do not vest immedi-
ately are adequate for prioritizing long-term company value. Rebecca A. Crawford, Note, Corporate
Governance Reform: How to Promote the Long-Term Health and Value of U.S. Corporations, 5
N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 905, 923 (2009) (arguing that "slowly vesting stock options will incentivize
directors and executives to focus on the long-term health of their corporations"). However, others
have questioned the adequacy of tying compensation predominantly to corporate shares. Attacking
the corporate gravy train, supra note 77 ("[Lucian A. Bebchuk] points out that equity-based bonus
plans align bankers' interests only with those of shareholders. This encourages them to make big
bets .... But if those bets go wrong ... [losses] are bome by unsuspecting bondholders and taxpay-
ers too."). It is possible to tie compensation to long-term performance using executive compensation
best practices. See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 67.
108. Lucian Bebchuk, Editorial, Congress Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb.
16, 2009, at Al5.
109. David Yermack, Editorial, Keeping the Pay Police at Bay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at
WI.
110. Attacking the corporate gravy train, supra note 77.
I11. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 533.
112. Steven Labaton, U.S. Will Order Pay Cuts at Firms With Bailout Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 2009, at A1.
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On the other hand, if the government does not act on the disclosures, lit-
tle would prevent a corporation from paying an exorbitant executive
salary,"' even if the corporation reported it. Corporations might disregard
the reporting as a mere formality that would never be questioned. Ironically,
this reporting system might even lead to a dramatic increase in salary, as
executives could cite the highest paid executives as comparisons during sal-
ary negotiations."'4 In sum, any deterrent effect would be negligible and
would not lead to any lowering of excessive executive compensation.
II. A POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGE To DEVELOPING A WORKABLE
CORPORATE WASTE DOCTRINE
This Note has explained how the corporate waste doctrine and the say-
on-pay bill, by themselves, are unlikely to make a significant dent in curbing
executive compensation. However, a litigation strategy that employs them
both, by filing a corporate waste claim after a say-on-pay vote, may give
shareholders the power to reduce executive compensation. Specifically, the
proposed litigation strategy would succeed even if it only progressed the suit
to the discovery phase."' After a few waste claims successfully pass the mo-
tion to dismiss stage, boards of directors will realize that they must listen to
their shareholders' say-on-pay votes or else risk incurring significant finan-
cial and reputational costs in attempting to make their case on the merits."16
Put another way, this litigation strategy would make the say-on-pay vote
effectively binding. These tools that shareholders currently possess could
incentivize a corporation's board of directors to curb excessive executive
compensation ex ante.
Section II.A discusses how a say-on-pay resolution can be used with the
corporate waste doctrine to meet Delaware's common law corporate waste
standards. Section II.B examines some hallmarks of this litigation strategy
that, under model circumstances, would enable shareholders to prevent ex-
cessive executive compensation by advancing waste claims beyond a motion
to dismiss, to the discovery stage of litigation. Finally, Section II.C ad-
dresses the concern that this litigation strategy would lead to a deluge of
cases in the Delaware courts if successfully employed.
113. It is unlikely that the corporate waste doctrine provides a deterrent, as evidenced by the
substantial increase in executive salaries since reporting began. Hunt, supra note 3.
114. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 533.
115. This Note takes no position as to what factors a court should examine when determining
a waste claim on its merits. This is a complicated issue that requires a full analysis of executive
compensation best practices. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 76. Instead, this Note
focuses on passing an initial Rule 23.1 dismissal in the hopes of reaching the costly hearing and
discovery phase of a case.
116. While a corporation may succeed in proving that there is no waste, an intrusive discovery
process is burdensome and can uncover other serious problems. Wells, supra note 8, at 730 ("The
court reached that conclusion [finding no waste], however, only after commissioning an intrusive
and embarrassing examination of National City's compensation plans, which left the directors liable
for damages of almost two million dollars [due to other, non-waste oversights].") (discussing Gallin
v. Nat'l City Bank, 281 N.Y.S. 795, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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A. Using the Say-on-Pay Resolution to Survive Early Dismissal
The model litigation strategy proposed in this Note would include two
signature features. First, shareholders should disapprove of their board of
directors' executive compensation practices through a say-on-pay resolution.
Second, these shareholder plaintiffs should attempt to demonstrate in the
pleadings that the consideration was so inadequate that the corporation did
not receive any value as a result of the compensation.
Before filing a waste claim, the shareholders should voice their disap-
proval through a say-on-pay provision. The proposed say-on-pay provision
in Congress is nonbinding."' While a nonbinding provision may be the best
standard from a corporate governance standpoint,"' it is not effective in pro-
viding the shareholders an adequate avenue for controlling excessive
executive compensation."' A board of directors may choose to ignore the
shareholders' advice after a resolution disapproving of the corporation's
executive pay packages. 20 In that case, the shareholders should bring a cor-
porate waste doctrine claim.
Finding a case where a corporation lost value under the executive's lead-
ership will be important in showing that the corporation did not receive any
substantial value from an executive. Although not dispositive, it is much
easier to argue waste when the corporation's value declines during an execu-
tive's tenure. For example, when Charles Prince became CEO of Citi in
117. Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269,
111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
118. Making the shareholder resolution nonbinding preserves the traditional function of the
board of directors to manage the corporation. See I JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX &
HAZEN ON CORPORATIONs 390-92 (2d ed. 2003).
119. This Note recognizes that a binding say-on-pay resolution may result in a similar out-
come as this Note proposes in Part II. However, a binding say-on-pay resolution is not an adequate
solution for two reasons. First, it would be extremely difficult for Congress to pass a binding say-on-
pay resolution, as evidenced by Congress's failure to do so despite past attempts. In fact, a binding
say-on-pay resolution has never been seriously considered in the United States. (Though the Nether-
lands and Norway recently passed binding say-on-pay legislation.) Stephen Davis, Does 'Say on
Pay' Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable, 1622 PLI/CORP. 30, 46 (2007).
The United States, however, is more inclined to follow the Great Britain model of a nonbinding
resolution. Laraine S. Rothenberg and Todd S. McCafferty, 'Say-on-Pay': Linking Executive
Pay to Performance, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202424735938#27 ("Shareholders and legislators in the United States have
generally followed the advisory approach and have not embraced the idea of giving shareholders
binding power."). Second, a binding say-on-pay resolution would force the board of directors to take
action. This Note proposes a more nuanced approach that allows the board of directors the necessary
discretion to manage the corporation while giving shareholders recourse when they feel the board of
directors is abusing its power. See infra Part II.
120. The Shell board of directors did not take substantial action to adjust executive compensa-
tion after shareholders voted to voice their objection to the company's executive pay plan. A say-on-
pay resolution is mandated under British law and is nonbinding, much like the proposed U.S. law.
Guy Chazan & Joann S. Lublin, Shell Investors Revolt over Executive Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., May
20, 2009, at BI ("Shell Chairman Jorma Ollila said board members 'take the outcome of this vote
very seriously and we will reflect carefully upon it.' But Sir Peter Job, head of Shell's remuneration
committee, stressed it was 'advisory' and wouldn't invalidate the pay award.").
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2003, a share of Citi stock was roughly $45 per share.121 When Prince re-
signed from Citi in 2007, its value had dropped to $30 per share.122 Even
worse, after Prince left Citi, the company's stock tumbled to below $2 per
share.123 Additionally, shareholders could look to other metrics of company
value such as corporate innovation, reputation, succession planning, and
employee development.124
One significant hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome in a corporate waste
claim is to prove that the board of directors did not act rationally. Plaintiff
shareholders should argue that the say-on-pay resolution at least defeats the
presumption of rationality and that the court needs to order discovery to
determine if waste was committed. The In re Citigroup court stated that "the
plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing
that the board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have
been based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best interests."l25 The
court concluded that it could not "determine[] with 'reasonable certainty'
that the plaintiff could prevail on no set of facts that may be inferred from
the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint." 26 In re Citigroup may mean
that the burden set forth in Brehm and In re Walt Disney is no longer so
heavy. In pursuing a litigation strategy, the plaintiffs should cite to In re Ci-
tigroup for the waste standard and avoid citing earlier Delaware law.127
A say-on-pay resolution disapproving of the board should suffice to
show that the court cannot reasonably infer that the decision was rational
and therefore not wasteful. If over 50 percent of the corporation's share-
holders disapprove of a board action, it would raise doubt as to the
rationality of that action.18 While the plaintiff shareholders may eventually
be unable to show that the board acted irrationally, they should at least sur-
vive the early dismissal stages of litigation.
121. Google Finance Historical Prices for Citigroup, http://www.google.com/finance/
historical?q=NYSE:C (last visited May 15, 2010).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Donald P. Delves, Getting beyond share price: the truer measure of corporate
value, ENTREPRENEUR, June 2008, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/
200909542.htmp; Margery Kraus, Op-Ed, Reputation is now a tangible measure of corporate value,
PRWEEK, May 26, 2003.
125. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quot-
ing White v. Panic, 738 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001)).
126. Id. at 139 (quoting Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-83 (Del. 2001)).
127. In re Citigroup has been cited seven times by the Delaware courts. In fact, a Westlaw
search conducted on December 27, 2009 for "964 A.2d 106" in the Delaware's Courts database
yielded seven results. In In re Countrywide Corp. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 846019, at *8 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 31, 2009), the court used In re Citigroup in discussing the corporate waste doctrine. This is
important for plaintiffs because In re Citigroup looked more favorably on the corporate waste doc-
trine compared with Brehm.
i28. Of course, even a disapproving say-on-pay resolution would not be enough to prove
irrationality per se. In fact, it may be likely that there will still be no finding of waste even with a
disapproving say-on-pay resolution. The goal of this litigation strategy, however, is merely to pass
the initial stages of litigation. See infra Section H.B.
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Plaintiff shareholders would next have to show that the corporation re-
ceived no substantial value as a result of compensation paid to the
executive.12 9 The standard is difficult to meet, as demonstrated by Delaware
case law. 30 For the purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss though, the
standard is not impossible. Plaintiffs in In re Citigroup were able to avoid
dismissal."'
In In re Citigroup, Charles Prince received $68 million in compensation
after resigning as CEO.3 2 Citi likely received some benefit from Prince's
"letter agreement," but the court refused to dismiss the suit.'33 Although the
court did not discuss its reasoning for allowing the claim to continue, it is
possible that the court felt the $68 million Prince received after leaving the
company exceeded any value he might have given the company.134
Additionally, the court stated that waste could be found when the con-
sideration received by the corporation was "so disproportionately small as to
lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade." 1' Plaintiffs can argue that an executive who is in charge of a corpo-
ration that decreases in value is not worth a large salary. Having a say-on-
pay resolution helps show that perhaps a reasonable person would not be
willing to make that deal and discovery is needed to ensure that no waste
was committed.
Of course, a proportional standard leads to line-drawing problems. The
Supreme Court highlighted this problem in 1933 when it stated that the
amount of compensation received by the executives was so large as to war-
rant investigation, but did not describe what payments qualify for this
treatment. It might be tempting to require all waste claims to undergo fur-
ther discovery; however, subsequent courts have, quite correctly, rejected
this view due to the overwhelming burden this would place on corporations
and the courts. A say-on-pay resolution could help to determine if the com-
pensation was disproportionate.
Passing these two hurdles solves the legal complications of bringing a
waste claim but does not address most courts' unwillingness to invoke the
doctrine. Chancery Judge Strine in Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga
129. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
130. Id.
131. 964 A.2d at 112.
132. Id. at 138.
133. Id. at 138-39.
134. Plaintiffs argued this in their brief opposing the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs' Answering
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Stay this Action or, in the Alternative, to
Dismiss the Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 1 124, In re Citigroup Inc.
S'holder Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC), 2009 WL 81303 (stating that Prince
received an exorbitant amount of income even despite the "disturbing inadequacies in Citigroup's
risk management and control procedures that directly implicated defendant Prince, shedding addi-
tional light on his involvement in the Company's historic collapse").
135. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del.
2000)).
136. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
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highlighted some of this unwillingness when he levied many criticisms
against the corporate waste doctrine.137 One criticism was that the corporate
waste doctrine should not be enforced to protect the interests of the minority
shareholders against the majority.' As support for this argument, Judge
Strine argued that because corporate property is not thought of as property
of the shareholders, minority shareholders should not have a claim for a gift
of their property.3 9 While it is open for debate whether a corporation is con-
sidered the property of the shareholders, it is likely that Delaware courts will
continue to construe the doctrine in this manner. This criticism is inapplica-
ble, however, when a majority of shareholders disapproves of a corporate
compensation structure through a say-on-pay provision.
Another of the courts' criticisms is that the corporate waste doctrine is
not necessary when the majority of the corporation's shareholders approves
a transaction. Chancery Judge Strine stated in Harbor Finance Partners:
If fully informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders have approved the
transaction, they have, it seems to me, made the decision that the transac-
tion is a fair exchange. As such, it is difficult to see the utility of allowing
litigation to proceed in which the plaintiffs are permitted discovery and a
possible trial, at great expense to the corporate defendants, in order to
prove to the court that the transaction was so devoid of merit that each and
every one of the voters comprising the majority must be disregarded as too
hopelessly misguided to be considered a person of ordinary sound business
judgment.14
The courts' reasoning for excluding waste claims in the past, however,
should permit a waste claim following a say-on-pay resolution. The court in
Harbor Finance Partners involved a merger that was approved by a majority
of shareholders. Other than electing the board of directors, the shareholders
do not get a voice in executive compensation. If Congress passes a say-on-
pay bill, then shareholders will have a voice, making it difficult to bring a
waste claim if the compensation structure is approved by a majority of
shareholders. But in using this reasoning, if a say-on-pay measure disap-
proves of the compensation structure, the "utility of allowing litigation to
proceed" is apparent.14' The say-on-pay amendment could give a voice to
shareholders concerning executive pay, and the corporate waste doctrine
could give force to that voice.
Finally, Delaware courts are concerned about enforcing the corporate
waste doctrine because of the feeling that "[c]ourts are ill-fitted to attempt to
weigh the adequacy of consideration under the waste standard or, ex post, to
137. 751 A.2d 879, 896-900 (Del. Ch. 1999).
138. Id. at 899. The court dismissed the explicit language of Rogers v. Hill, which stated that
"majority stockholders have no power to give away corporate property against the protest of the
minority." 289 U.S. at 591-92.
139. Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 900.




judge appropriate degrees of business risk." 42 The model litigation strategy
described in this section adequately addresses this concern. The courts' con-
cerns in ruling on waste cases will be alleviated by the presence of a
shareholder say-on-pay vote disapproving of the board action. Although a
disapproving say-on-pay resolution may not be dispositive of waste, such a
resolution would at least allow plaintiff shareholders to advance beyond the
initial stages of litigation.
B. The Rationale of the Model Litigation Strategy
In pursuing a corporate waste claim in conjunction with a say-on-pay
provision, the plaintiff shareholders' goal should be to pass the initial stages
of litigation and require the board of directors to try the case on the merits to
determine if there has been waste. If shareholders bring a waste claim after
voicing disapproval through a say-on-pay resolution, it may force Delaware
courts to allow cases to pass Rule 23.1 scrutiny and require an evidentiary
hearing and discovery.
As a result of this proposed application of the doctrine, corporations-
fearing the financial and reputational costs of further adjudication-will
preemptively reform executive compensation to avoid litigation altogether.
Breathing life back into the corporate waste doctrine through the say-on-pay
provision would prevent corporations from ignoring the wishes of disgrun-
tled shareholders, like those in the Shell Oil situation.143 Executive
compensation reform should provide accountability to the shareholders,
those with the ultimate stake in the business.'
Shareholders can avoid a Rule 23.1 dismissal by passing a disapproving
say-on-pay resolution. A court would be reluctant to defer to the board of
directors, as they have in the past, when over 50 percent of the shareholders
have disapproved of their action. 4 Using a say-on-pay resolution would
also silence the main critics of the corporate waste doctrine who claim that a
waste claim is unworkable when there is a fully informed vote of disinter-
ested shareholders who approve an action.'4 A corporate waste doctrine
would certainly be viable when shareholders disapprove of an action.
142. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See supra Section I.B.
144. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 67, at 672 ("The most promising route to improving pay
arrangements is thus to make boards more accountable to shareholders and more focused on share-
holder interests.").
145. E.g. Blasius Indus., v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that a
board action that stifles a shareholder vote is not entitled to deference and recognizing that corpora-
tions have long "dismiss[ed] the stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical
importance").
146. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1318 (2001) ("The waste exception, which is a
vestige of a long-gone era of corporation law, has no present-day utility. When fully informed, disin-
terested stockholders have approved a transaction, on what principled basis could a court determine
that the transaction is wasteful?").
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C. The Model Litigation Strategy Will Not Lead to Excessive Litigation
Some might argue that there will be an excessive amount of litigation if
waste claims routinely are allowed to reach discovery. This makes sense: if
the corporate waste doctrine becomes enforceable, more shareholders will
invoke it. Boards of directors would prefer to avoid this scenario; they have
to make tough decisions and would prefer not to worry about shareholders
challenging their every move. This scenario is unlikely to happen, though,
for the following reasons. An increase in cases is unlikely to occur because
say-on-pay resolutions disapproving of the board of directors would be
rare.147 Shareholders would likely only invoke a negative say-on-pay resolu-
tion in the rarest of circumstances because of the practical difficulties of
having more than half of the shareholders openly disagree with the board of
directors. Waste claims brought without a disapproving say-on-pay resolu-
tion should continue to be dismissed at an early stage. The goal of
strengthening the corporate waste doctrine is not to increase frivolous law-
suits, but instead to provide shareholders with an avenue to control
excessive compensation.
Second, a small increase in litigation should not be a significant con-
cern. Although a larger use of judicial resources means that it will cost more
time and money to deal with these issues, the serious call for executive
compensation reform should trump these concerns. Taxpayer money would
be used for many of the alternative enforcement mechanisms proposed in
Part I. The cost of increased resources in a targeted number of cases, how-
ever, would likely be smaller than these other, broad-based reforms.
Finally, this type of shareholder power would be limited to excessive
compensation claims because the say-on-pay resolution only governs execu-
tive compensation. Boards of directors would not need to worry about every
decision they make being scrutinized. While it is true that boards of direc-
tors must make tough decisions in the best interest of the company, the
solution proposed above allows boards to continue to act freely and would
only be applied in the most egregious circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Executive compensation reform and regulation is virtually certain to oc-
cur in the coming months and years. The current debate deals with what that
reform should look like. A say-on-pay provision, somewhat hollow on its
own, could be used as a gatekeeper of sorts for corporate waste claims. A
revitalized corporate waste doctrine would allow shareholders to have some
meaningful power as a safeguard against a board of directors that exces-
sively compensates executives. Using these two tools in tandem would allow
147. Paul Hodgson, A Brief History of Say on Pay, IVEY Bus. J.. Sept./Oct. 2009, ovmailh!e at
http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/article.asp?intArticle_ID=856 (finding that say-on-pay resolu-
tions will be rare and stating that "[elven companies that actually had a vote on pay on the agenda,
saw support for excessive pay as usual remain strong") (emphasis omitted).
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shareholders to address executive compensation concerns while not over-
burdening corporations with regulation and litigation.
Returning to the AIG situation discussed at the beginning, executives
eventually agreed to pay back their bonuses. For every AIG controversy in
the news, though, many other egregious bonus payments fly under the radar.
Corporations that do not make the front page of the Wall Street Journal will
have no public pressure to reduce their executive compensation amounts. A
revitalized corporate waste doctrine, in conjunction with a say-on-pay reso-
lution, will provide shareholders in all corporations with a voice against a
wasteful board of directors.
